Abstract-We are experiencing an explosion in the amount of sensors measuring our activities and the world around us. These sensors are spread throughout the built environment and can help us perform state estimation and control of related systems, but they are often built and/or maintained by third parties or system users. As a result, by outsourcing system measurement to third parties, the controller must accept their measurements without being able to directly verify the sensors' correct operation. Instead, detection and rejection of measurements from faulty sensors must be done with the raw data only. Towards this goal, we present a probabilistic formulation of state estimation with a model for possibly faulty behavior of sensors. We also take into consideration the possibility that the control designer may not know the characteristics of faulty measurements, and discuss how they may be alternatively detected by how much they differ from "expected" measurements. We detail implementation of the probabilistic formalism in a particle filtering application. Finally, we present results that use these methods, where the state of road traffic on a freeway is estimated via a particle filter by fusing third-party global navigational satellite system readings, while rejecting faulty measurements. The results demonstrate that faulty third-party measurements may be detected and removed without explicit models of a fault's characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much ado has been made about the contemporary explosion of ubiquitous sensors and actuators in engineered artifacts and the built environment. "Big data," the "Internet of Things" -these and other recently-coined, oft-heard phrases call back to the idea that, in the past few years, a sea change has occurred in our ability to measure the world. For control and systems engineers, these new data increase the ability to measure and precisely control built-environment systems, with applications like localized responsive building HVAC regulation [1] , connected vehicles for traffic management and accident reduction [2] , and power systems, up to and including automated coordination between power producers, consumers, and storers in a "smart" grid [3] . When thirdparty measurements are collected and submitted by end users of Internet-of-Things devices and the like, fusion of these data can enhance the estimation and control of these sorts of highly-sensed and/or highly-actuated systems.
However, these new data can present their own problems. Whereas an engineer has traditionally designed control and estimation methods for a system whose components (including the sensors) she has been able to design and examine in detail, third-party data may be collected and 1 Mechanical Engineering Department and Partners for Advanced Transportation Technologies, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA {mwright, horowitz}@berkeley.edu submitted by a sensor that is faulty, overly noisy, tamperedwith, or otherwise misreporting. It may not be feasible for the engineer to have a validated fault-detection method for every possible misconfiguration of every type of device that a third party might use to collect and report measurements.
In [4] , for example, we considered a state estimator for road traffic that uses connected vehicles' speeds as reported by embedded global navigational satellite system (GNSS) transponders. An estimator might receive information that a vehicle had zero velocity on a road as indication that a traffic jam had formed and act accordingly. But if, instead, the vehicle was was stopped off the road but was misreporting its location due to GNSS drift, and no traffic jam was present, would the estimator be able to differentiate the two cases?
In this paper, we outline a simple method for rejection of potentially-faulty measurements such as these in the context of real-time state estimation. We previously used this method for the results presented in [4] but only briefly mentioned it there; the present paper contributes a detailed derivation and discussion. Section II gives a mathematical statement of our problem, and Section III gives a solution and discusses application details. We apply this solution to the widely-used particle filter algorithm, used for state estimation in nonlinear systems, in Section IV. The above stopped-car example is inspired by the work in [4] that in turn motivated the material presented in the present paper; Section V describes the application in [4] 's results, where faulty measurements from third-party GNSS devices were detected in a particle filtering application for estimating vehicle density on a freeway in southern California.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let x k ∈ R N denote the state vector of our system at time k, and y k ∈ R M k denote the measurement vector at time k (note that y k may be of different dimensionality at different times k). The state and observation vectors evolve over time through discrete-time stochastic state and output equations, denoted F θ (·) and G θ (·) respectively:
with θ a parameter vector describing the randomness or process/measurement noise of F and G. An alternative probabilistic notation may rewrite (1) as
where X k (Y k ) denotes a random variable and x k (y k ) the value of a particular realization. The functions f (·) and g(·) are the probability density functions (PDFs) induced by F θ (·) and G θ (·), respectively. The initial condition of the system, x 0 , is assumed fixed or distributed with some known density p(x 0 |θ). More precisely, f (x k |x k−1 , θ) is a Markov transition kernel with a distribution on the random variable
, and g(y k |x k , θ) is a typical observation likelihood. To reduce notational clutter, we omit the symbol θ from now on. In (2), the observation PDF is a joint PDF over all elements of the observation vector Y k . This is the most general formulation of this PDF, and allows for all elements of Y k to be statistically dependent. This would be appropriate, if, for example, the entire vector Y k was reported by a single sensor, and the noise in measuring one element of Y k was correlated with the noise in measuring the other elements.
In our setting, however, we are dealing with many different sensors and reporting devices. Say that Y k contains measurements from m k different sensors (like M k (the length of Y k ), m k may be different at different timesteps k), and let k j ∈ {1, . . . , m k } index these sensors. Say that Y kj is the random vector that contains the element(s) of Y k from sensor k j . Now, if we assume that individual sensors k j have statistically independent measurement noises, we may rewrite (2b) as (c.f. [4, Assumption 2, (14)])
where y kj is the measurement(s) received from sensor k j (i.e., a realization of the random vector Y kj ), and g kj (·) is the PDF for Y kj . We have factored g(·) into its component per-sensor PDFs.
As written in (3), g kj (·) is in a general form, with no explicit model of faulty vs non-faulty measurements. We now describe how we handle faulty sensors by explicitly indicating whether sensor k j is reporting in either a valid (i.e., as intended) mode, or an erroneous mode. To this end, we introduce a Bernoulli random variable Z kj , which takes value 1 in the event that a measurement from sensor k j is not faulty, and value 0 in the event that a measurement is faulty. Written as a probability mass function (PMF),
where φ kj is a weight equal to the probability that sensor k j reports a measurement in a valid, as-intended manner. The parameter φ kj being a function of x k allows for the possibility that the Z kj are dependent on X k ; that is, that certain areas of the state space for x k could lead to a greater likelihood of erroneous measurements than others. This is the most general formulation, and we may simplify the problem by assuming independence of Z kj from X k later. Now, we can condition g kj (·) from (3) on Z kj :
where g 1 kj (·) is the PDF for the valid sensor behavior, and g 0 kj (·) is the PDF for erroneous measurements. In practice, we should have a model for g 1 kj (·), the expected behavior of the sensor, but g 0 kj (·) may be unknown if we cannot predict every way in which the sensor may fail.
III. FAULT DETECTION A. Solution
In this formulation, detecting a fault for a particular sensor k j means determining whether z kj is equal to 0 or 1. Of course, z kj is not directly observable, and its value must be estimated alongside x k from the observed y kj .
This can be written as a slight extension of traditional recursive Bayesian filtering. Let Z k represent the collection of random variables Z kj at time k. Assume that at time k we have an estimate of the PDF p(z k−1 , x k−1 |y k−1 ). Then, we can predict Z k and X k before observing measurements Y k : (6) and update our predictions once measurements Y k have been received:
Equations (6) and (7) are the prediction and filtering steps, respectively, of recursive Bayesian filtering, with a slight modification in that Z k is added. We will outline how these equations and PDFs are different from the standard formulation; a discussion of Bayesian filtering considering only the variables X k and Y k is available in many references.
Marginalization of the random variables Z k−1 and X k−1 in (6) is consistent with the marginalization of X k−1 in traditional Bayesian filtering; it relies on an assumption (explicit in the state space model (2) ) that X k and Z k are conditionally independent of X k−1 and
The function p(z k |x k ) is the prior PMF of fault/non-fault sensor behavior (prior, in that it is the PMF of Z k before the measurement vector Y k is seen). The PDF p(y k |x k , z k ) is the joint likelihood of this measurement vector Y k from our unobserved system variables X k and Z k . Since, in (3), we assumed that the sensors k j had independent measurement noises, and could factor the observation model across sensors k j , we will do the same thing with these two functions:
with p(z kj |x k ) and g (4) and (5), respectively.
The marginal likelihood
plays the role of a normalizing constant.
From the above equations, we can see that the determination of whether a sensor k j is faulty at time k is done during the calculation of (7). If we focus on a particular sensor k j , marginalizing out all other sensors in (7), the posterior PMF for Z kj for a particular value of X k can be written as
From (10), we can see that determining the probability that a sensor is faulty is itself a Bayesian inference problem, with p(z kj |x k ) being a prior distribution and g
again is a marginal likelihood that acts as a normalizing constant.
If we would like to compute p(z kj |y kj ), averaging over all possible values of X k , we can use the fact that Z kj is conditionally independent of Y k−1 given X k to marginalize over X k :
B. Empirical proportionality constants
Recall that we may only have a model of g z k j kj (y kj |x k ) for the case Z kj = 1, if we cannot predict every way a measurement might be faulty. In this case, the only value we can calculate from (10) is the numerator for the case that Z kj equals one, as computing (11) would require a model of g 0 kj (y kj |x k ). So from (10), dropping the normalizing denominator,
and from (12),
Or, equivalently,
for some constant C.
We have replaced the normalizing denominators containing g 0 kj (·) with a constant that must be estimated. While the constant C in (15) will almost certainly be different for every time k and sensor k j , it makes sense to simplify the problem by having many sensors share the same value. This value could be estimated empirically through one of many methods. For example, it could be set such that the sensor with the highest value of the integral in (15) has a P (Z kj = 1|Y kj = y kj ) equal to one, and other sensors are normalized against this best-performing sensor by using the same value of C. Or, if there is data available to calibrate model parameters against, one could perform several estimation runs over the state trajectory with varying values of C, and select a value that results in the best performance.
C. Fault probability thresholding
In practice, it is often desirable to be robust to faults, and to err on the side of caution when assimilating measurements that may be faulty. This is especially relevant if our models for g z k j kj (y kj |x k ) are estimates, and consequently cannot be certain that resulting estimates of P (Z kj = 1|X k = x k , Y kj = y kj ) are accurate. In this case, it is reasonable to select some constant γ ∈ (0, 1), and, for each sensor k j , use (12) to determine whether P (Z kj = 1|Y kj = y kj ) > γ. For sensors that do not meet this threshold and this inequality is false, we would use a fault probability of one when computing posterior PDFs, effectively discarding the sensor's measurement, and vice-versa for sensors where this inequality is true. For example, selecting γ = 0.95 means that we only assimilate measurements from sensors that we estimate have at least a 95% probability of being non-faulty.
D. Considerations for Application
We have two choices in how we may implement state estimation in this framework. First, we could perform the calculations of (6) and (7) and keep estimates of p(z k , x k |y k ) for times k of interest, but this is hard to scale. If the size of an estimate of p(x k |y k ) is proportional to N (the dimensionality of X k ), the size of an estimate of the joint PDF p(z k , x k |y k ) may be proportional to N ·2 M k (recall M k is the length of Y k ), since a different estimate of X k may exist for every combination of faulty/not faulty of all sensor k j . For all but trivial problems, this may be infeasible.
The second choice for implementation is to instead compute and store estimates of
marginalizing out the variables Z kj and returning to our more manageable N -dimensional PDF. Since we are marginalizing along the z kj , the PDF p(x k |y k ) would be weighted by the estimated probability of fault of each sensor k j .
E. Extension: Bayesian Updates of Fault Probabilities
It is usually the case that a particular sensor will report more than once, at different times k. In this case, it is reasonable to use past estimates of fault probability at times k < k to inform our prior fault probability φ kj at time k. A particularly simple method for this comes from Bayesian statistics: rather than letting φ kj (x k ) be fixed (that is, fixed for fixed values of x k ), we say that it is a random variable, and estimate it from Y k as well. A Bernoulli random variable such as φ kj (·) is often modeled as being drawn from a beta distribution, the conjugate prior of the Bernoulli distribution.
For a beta distribution for a particular sensor's fault probability, φ kj ∼ Beta(α kj , β kj ), we select the parameters based on prior belief about what values are more and less likely for φ kj . Then, when we wish to use a value for φ kj in, e.g., (4), some estimate of φ kj , such as a mean or modal value from its beta distribution, can be used instead. Finally, after we have obtained a posterior estimate of Z kj |Y kj , a Bayesian update of φ kj 's distribution is performed:
and this new distribution is used as the prior when the sensor reports again at future times k.
IV. PARTICLE FILTER IMPLEMENTATION
The methods discussed so far make use of many PDFs (and integrals thereof). These operations may be performed in closed form when the PDFs can be expressed in closed form and the integrals are relatively simple, but this is often not the case when the system (1) is nonlinear.
For these situations, state estimation is often performed using Monte Carlo methods, with perhaps the most widelyused method being the particle filter [5] . A particle filter may be used when no closed-form model for f (·) exists (but the PDF may be sampled from by, e.g., running a stochastic simulation many times) and/or if numerically computing the integrals in (6) and (9) is computationally expensive.
A particle filter is constructed by replacing PDFs for X k and Z k with approximate PDFs made up of many discrete samples from the continuous PDF. We extend a traditional particle filter by including the random variable Z k from (6):
is calculated for every particle p in (19), we normalize these probabilities such that they sum to one:
(20)
In the particle filter framework, we can also perform a Monte Carlo approximation of P (Z kj = 1|Y kj = y kj ) and related calculations from (10)-(14). Examining (14) in particular, An alternative fault detection scheme that might be more lenient would be to reject only measurements k j that fail to pass some low threshold of non-fault probability for every particle:
for small γ. This is alternative approximation of the integral the particle filter replaces. This might be appropriate if the engineer is concerned primarily with rejecting measurements that might cause numerical breakdown in the particle filter.
V. A CASE STUDY: GNSS SENSOR FUSION FOR HIGHWAY TRAFFIC STATE ESTIMATION
Recall our example of a traffic control system that took possibly faulty third-party data from connected vehicles' GNSS sensors to estimate the state of a road network. Accurate knowledge of traffic systems' operations is a key requirement for reactive traffic control, and gaining this knowledge from third-party data is a key part of modern intelligent transportation system applications.
In [4, Section IV-B], we presented results obtained using a particle filter that used the techniques detailed in Sections III and IV. We only briefly mentioned the use of the fault detection techniques in [4] ; this section discusses them in detail. We estimated freeway traffic density using fused third-and first-party data. The particle filter used a finitevolume method known as the cell transmission model for its stochastic model f (·) (see [4] for full implementation details). We demonstrated the particle filter's performance on (Fig. 1) . We also obtained flow count data from inductive 35 loop detectors, which operate by passing an electric current through a buried metal loop and detect when a vehicle passes above and interferes with the magnetic field (Fig. 2) . The loop detectors are installed and maintained by the California Department of Transportation [6] , and their data can be considered first-party data and less prone to undetected faults than the third-party GNSS data. A high vehicle density is predictive of congestion, and hence low vehicle speeds. While the time-space contour of the GNSS data shares many of the macro-scale features that appear in the loop data, it also has several features of low speed (i.e., high traffic density) that do not appear in the loop data. It is likely that these readings correspond to stopped cars adjacent to the highway whose lat-lon misidentified them as on the road, or outlier vehicles whose speed are not characteristic of the speed of traffic.
As an example, the string of low-speed points near 2:00 AM and link 40 (Fig. 1) are almost certainly faulty measurements, as they are not confirmed by high density in the loop data (Fig. 2) and high congestion in the early morning hours is not typical. A state estimation scheme that did not filter out these measurements would drive the state estimate to some unrealistic area of the state space.
In the results presented in [4] , we performed fault detection and measurement rejection of the GNSS data to filter out measurements such as these. In particular, we used for the non-faulty GNSS measurement likelihood g Fig. 1 remain, but several isolated points with significantly different values than nearby surrounding points have been filtered out. Note that, while there are still a handful of points from the early-morning low-speed group discussed in Section V, the group's extent has been greatly reduced. For γ = 0.01 (b), these isolated early-morning points are completely removed, as well as several other groups. Note in particular that groups of points near the ending time period of congestion (e.g., near 9:00 and link 20) have been removed; one can see that these points were actually somewhat in disagreement with the inductive loop data (Fig. 2) , which sees the congestion in this area mostly dispersing by 9:00. Finally, for γ = 0.1 (c), points have been filtered out through most of the area of the contour; only GNSS points that show high congestion concurrent with the loop detectors' high density observations remain. (Fig. 3) . In [4] , a value of 0.01 for γ was used. This value was selected via hand-tuning. Automatic tuning of γ via iterated simulation, or in real-time in response to observed estimation error, would be a goal of future work. A histogram of empirical likelihoods for the GNSS measurements is given in Fig. 4 .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered a problem where state estimation is desired, but some measurements may be faulty in unknown ways. Our method for handling this problem explicitly weights measurements in the state estimator by their empirically-observed likelihood of known, correctoperational modes. While our method has a drawback in that, without a good model of faults, we must estimate a proportionality constant, this is unavoidable, as outsourcing sensing means that the controller cannot predict every way an outside sensor may malfunction.
Our discussion was in the context of sensors that are unintentionally faulty, but these methods are also applicable for robustness to falsified sensors. If a third party has control of sensors used by a control system, a malicious actor may feed spoofed measurements to the system to purposely manipulate its operation. Our fault-model-free method may complement existing defenses that actively search for patterns indicative of spoofed data: perhaps the lack of an explicit model for faulty or spoofed data may make it harder for attacks to be tailored to evade such a detector.
